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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case 
Appellant initiated this action by which it sought to judicially foreclose a mechanic's 
liens in accordance with Idaho Code§ 45-501, et seq. After commencement, this action was 
consolidated with another mechanic's lien foreclosure action commenced by Kasco of Idaho, 
LLC, which involved the same real property located in Post Falls, Idaho. 1 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On February 26, 2013, the Respondents, Dan S. Jacobson, Sage Holdings, LLC, Steven 
G. Lazar, The Mitchell A. Martin and Karen C. Martin Family Trust dated August 9, 2005, 
Devon Chapman, HLT Real Estate, LLC, Monument Heights, LLC, Anthony St. Louis, Andrea 
Stephens, and Lilly Properties, Inc. (hereinafter collectively "Respondents"), filed Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff, ACI Northwest, Inc. (R. at 42-44). A hearing 
was conducted on March 26, 2013, at which time the trial court took the matter under advisement 
Motion. On April 5, 2013, the court issued a written decision granting Respondents' Motion. (R. 
at 117-127). 
The trial court subsequently issued a Partial Summary Judgment Against A CI Northwest, 
Inc., thereby establishing that each of Appellant's mechanic's liens were lost and unenforceable 
against the legal title held by the trustee under two deeds of trust which the Respondents hold 
varying interests. (R. at 191-93). By Order entered May 17, 2013, the trial court entered a Rule 
54(b) Certificate as to Appellant's claims against the Respondents. (R. at 209-214). Appellant 
filed this appeal on June 7, 2013. (R. at 221-26). 
C. Statement of Facts 
Appellant's Concise Statement of Facts reads more like an editorial column than a 
recitation of the pertinent facts. It is littered with Appellant's personal statements which have no 
foundation in the limited clerk's record it has preserved on appeal. For instance, the first four 
1 The consolidated Kasco ofldaho, LLC matter has twice been before this Court; Docket Nos. 39244-201 l and 
40474-2012. The first appeal was dismissed on the basis the notice of appeal was untimely filed. The second 
appeal is currently pending, awaiting oral argument. 
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paragraphs do not contain one single reference to the record. Moreover, many of the "facts" 
contained in those paragraphs are disputed and not central to this appeal. "Evidence not a part of 
the record before the trial court will not be considered on appeal." Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 
710 (2007). 
Next, the clerk's record preserved in this appeal is extremely limited. To begin, it does 
not contain a copy of Appellant's initial or amended pleading, both of which were relied upon as 
support for Respondents' motion for summary judgment. (R. at 42-44). Given the constrained 
record, Respondent will rely upon the District Court's findings of fact in those instances where 
the Appellant has failed to adequately preserve the clerk's record. 
For these reasons, Respondents direct this Court to the following statement of facts to the 
extent those cited by Appellant are incomplete and/or fail to contain proper citations to the 
transcript and record of the proceedings below: 
1. On May 27, 2008, Appellant allegedly commenced furnishing labor, materials and 
services in the improvement of real property owned by Monument Heights, LLC, located in Post 
Falls, Idaho. (R. at 119). 
2. On August I, 2008, Respondent, Monument Heights, LLC executed and delivered to 
the Respondents, Dan S. Jacobson, Sage Holdings, LLC, Steven G. Lazar, the Mitchell A. Martin 
and Karen C. Martin Family Trust dated August 9, 2005, and Devon Chapman, a Deed of Trust 
conveying three (3) separate parcels of real property in Kootenai County, Idaho, to a trustee as 
security for payment of an indebtedness owed to the beneficiaries thereunder. (R. at 66-70, 119). 
The Deed of Trust was subsequently recorded with the Kootenai County Recorder on August 6, 
2008 as Instrument 2172582000 (hereinafter "Monument Heights Deed of Trust"). Id. 
3. On January 29, 2009, Appellant caused a mechanics liens to be recorded with the 
Kootenai County Recorder. (R. at 119). The lien purported to secure the sum of$53,437.10 due 
and owing for labor, materials and services Appellant provided in the improvement of the three 
(3) parcels of property owned by Respondent, Monument Heights, LLC. /d. 
4. On July 28, 2009, Appellant caused an Endorsement to Claim of Lien for Payment on 
Account to be recorded with the Kootenai County Recorder. (R. at 119). The instrument 
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references the Claim of Lien recorded January 29, 2009 and states that a payment on account was 
received from Respondent, Monument Heights, LLC on February 11, 2009, in the amount of 
$25,000.00. Id. 
5. Six (6) months after the payment was allegedly made is August 11, 2009. 
6. On August 10, 2009, Appellant commenced this action to judicially foreclose its 
mechanic's lien. (R. at 119). In its pleading, Appellant claimed that its mechanic's lien secured 
the principal sum of $312,972.60. (39244-2011 R., Vol. 1, p. 5, ,I 15). 
7. On March 8, 2011, the District Court entered a Partial Summary Judgment Against 
AC/ Northwest, Inc. (R. at 3, 17). The Judgment established that Appellant's Claim of Lien only 
secures the maximum amount of $28,437.10, if subsequently adjudged to be valid and 
enforceable. Id. 
8. On or about March 11, 2011, Respondent, Monument Heights, LLC, sold a portion of 
the real property encumbered by the Monument Heights Deed of Trust to Respondents, Anthony 
L. St. Louis and Andrea J. Stephens. As consideration, Respondents, Anthony St. Louis and 
Andrea Stephens, executed and delivered to Respondent, Monument Heights, LLC, a Deed of 
Trust conveying a parcel of real property in Kootenai County, Idaho, to a trustee as security for 
payment of an indebtedness owed to the Respondent, Monument Heights, LLC. (R. at 71-74). 
(hereinafter "St. Louis/Stephens Deed of Trust"). 
9. By instrument recorded March 15, 2011, Respondent, Monument Heights, LLC, 
assigned its interest under the St. Louis/Stephens Deed of Trust to Respondent, Lilly Properties, 
Inc; Assignment of Secured Note & Deed of Trust. (R. at 75-77). 
10. By instrument recorded June 1, 2011, Respondent, Steven G. Lazar, assigned his 
interest under the Monument Heights Deed of Trust to Respondent, HLT Real Estate, LLC; 
Assignment of Secured Note, Deed of Trust &Assignment of Rents. (R. at 78-79). 
11. On June 14, 2011, Appellant allegedly re-commenced furnishing labor, materials and 
services in the improvement of real property owned by Monument Heights, LLC, located in Post 
Falls, Idaho. (R. at 120). Appellant purportedly invoiced Respondent, Monument Heights, LLC, 
the sum of $47,658.65 for this additional work. Id. 
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12. On July 26, 2011, Appellant recorded a second mechanic's lien which it claims 
secures the principal sum of$462,780.46; Notice of Claim of Lien. (R. at 120). 
13. Six (6) months after the second lien was filed occurred on January 26, 2012. 
14. On January 12, 2012, Appellant filed an Amended Complaint in this action seeking 
to judicially foreclose its mechanic's liens. (R. at 120). 
15. Pioneer Title Company of Kootenai County was initially designated as the Trustee 
under the Monument Heights Deed of Trust. (R. at 66-70). 
16. On January 20, 2010, Charles R. Dean, Jr. was appointed as the Successor Trustee 
under the Monument Heights Deed of Trust. (R. at 80-82, 84). At all times since that date, Mr. 
Dean has remained the Trustee thereof. (R. at 84). 
17. On March 11, 2011, Pioneer Title Company of Kootenai County, Inc. was the 
appointed as the Trustee under the St. Louis/Stephens Deed of Trust. (R. at 57, 119). At all 
times since that date, Pioneer Title Company of Kootenai County has remained the Trustee 
thereof. Id. 
18. Appellant has alleged that its mechanic's liens constitute enforceable, first priority 
liens against the real property described therein. (R. at 49). 
19. To date, Appellant has not named or sought to join either of the trustees to 
Respondents deeds of trust, which Appellant alleges were junior and subordinate to its 
mechanic's liens. (R. at 120). 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court applies the same standard of 
review used by the district court in ruling on the motion." Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 58, 64 
(2013); citing Sec. Fin. Fund, LLC v. Thomason, 153 Idaho 343,346 (2012). Summary 
judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 56(c). When a summary judgment 
motion has been supported by depositions, affidavits, or other evidence, the adverse party "may 
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, 
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by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. 56(e). A mere scintilla of evidence or only a slight doubt as 
to the facts is insufficient to withstand summary judgment; there must be sufficient evidence 
upon which a jury could reasonably return a verdict for the party opposing the motion. 
Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87 (1986). 
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden to show that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. 
McCorkle v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 550,554 (Ct. App. 2005). "When the 
party moving for summary judgment will not carry the burden of production or proof at trial, the 
'genuine issue of material fact' burden may be met by establishing the absence of evidence on an 
element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial." Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 
308, 311 (Ct. App. 1994). Once such an absence of evidence has been demonstrated, the burden 
shifts to the party opposing the motion to show through further depositions, discovery responses, 
or affidavits that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial or to show a valid justification for its 
failure to do so under I.R.C.P. 56(t). Id. 
When a court considers a motion for summary judgment, all facts are to be liberally 
construed in favor of the nonmoving party, and the court must draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the party resisting the motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517 
(1991 ). "However, where an action will be tried before the court without a jury 'the trial judge is 
not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the non-moving party, but rather the judge is free 
to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from the uncontroverted evidentiary facts, 
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences."' Quemada v. Arizmendez, 153 Idaho 609, 613 
(2012). 
III. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 2 
H. Whether Respondents are Entitled to an Award of their Fees and Costs Incurred 
Defending this Appeal Pursuant to I.A.R. 11.2, 40 and 41. 
2 Appellant designates the issues on appeal numerically, yet the Argument section lists the corresponding issues 
alphabetically. For the sake of clarity, Respondent will address the Issues in the alphabetical manner utilized in 
Appellant's Argument section. 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Appellant Has Failed to Demonstrate Whye the Parkwest Homes II Should be 
Reversed. 
On appeal, Appellant primarily takes aim at this Court's Parkwest Homes Ii decision. In 
an attempt to urge this Court to modify or reverse that holding as it applies to deed of trust 
trustees, Appellant suggests that the legal title held by the trustee is so minimal that they should 
not be regarded as necessary parties. This argument completely ignores the underlying basis for 
the Parkwest Homes II decision; that being our Legislature has defined Idaho as being a "title 
theory" state. For that reason, it is for the Legislature to address via a change in legislation. To 
ignore the plain language and effect of Idaho's Trust Deed Act would amount to an unwarranted 
encroachment of the separation of powers. Next, Appellant has failed to meet its burden and 
demonstrate that the rule of stare decisis should not be adhered to in this instance. For these 
important fundamental reasons, Respondents submit that there is no basis to abruptly deviate 
from this Court's holding in Parkwest Homes II. 
1. Idaho's Appellate Courts have Consistently Held that LC.§ 45-510 
Renders a Lien Lost and Unenforceable Against those Subordinate 
Interests not Timely Joined. 
In Idaho, the right to file mechanic's liens exists solely as a result of statutory enactment. 
Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754, 760 (1999). "The 
provisions of LC.§ 45-501 are to be liberally construed in the favor of the persons who perform 
labor upon or furnish materials to be used in the construction, alteration, or repair of a building 
or structure." L & W Supply Corp. v. Chartrand Family Trust, 136 Idaho 738, 742-43 (2002); 
citing Great Plains Equip., Inc., 132 Idaho at 760. "This rule, however, 'does not permit the 
court to create a lien where none exists or was intended by the legislature."' Id., at 743; citing 
Great Plains Equip., Inc., 132 Idaho at 761. "Therefore, while 'this section will be liberally 
3 For clarification, Respondents' refer to Parkwest Homes, LLC v. Barnson, 149 Idaho 603 (2010) as Parkwest 
Homes I, and Parkwest Homes, LLC v. Barnson, 154 Idaho 678 (2013) as Parkwest Homes II. 
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construed,' 'the statutory requirements must be substantially complied with in order to perfect a 
valid mechanic's lien." Id.; citing Pierson v. Sewell, 97 Idaho 38, 41 (1975). 
"Idaho Code § 45-510 provides a court with jurisdiction to enforce a lien when a lien is 
filed and an action commenced within six months." Parkwest Hornes, LLC v. Branson, 154 Idaho 
678, 684 (2013). That statute provides in pertinent part: 
No lien provided for in this chapter binds any building, mmmg claim, 
improvement or structure for a longer period than six (6) months after the claim 
has been filed, unless proceedings be commenced in a proper court within that 
time to enforce such lien; or unless a payment on account is made, ... , and such 
payment or credit and expiration date, is indorsed on the record of the lien, then 
six (6) months after the date of such payment or expiration of extension. 
I.C. § 45-510. "The Idaho statute does not, in terms, prescribe who shall be made parties to the 
action thereby required to be brought; but we agree with the learned judge of the court below that 
it necessarily means that it must be brought against all of those whose rights, estates, or interests 
are claimed to be adverse and subordinate; otherwise they could not be concluded." Cont 'l & 
Commercial Trust & Sav. Bank v. Pac. Coast Pipe Co., 222 F. 781, 788 (9th Cir. 1915). Most 
recently in Parkwest Hornes, II, this Court announced without qualification that "when seeking 
to foreclose a lien on property encumbered by a deed of trust, it is necessary to name the trustee 
who holds legal title to the property." 154 Idaho at 685. 
"An action which does not include all necessary parties does not stop the running of the 
statute as to the omitted parties." 56 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 392. "Even if an action is 
brought to enforce a lien within a six month period, it is lost against the interests of persons not 
named." Parkwest Hornes II, 154 Idaho at 684; accord 56 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens§ 392 ("An 
action which does not include all necessary parties does not stop the running of the statute as to 
the omitted parties."); see also Western Loan & Bldg. Co. v. Gem State Lumber Co., 32 Idaho 
497, 185 P. 554, 555 (1919) ("Of consequence, a mechanic's lien is lost and unenforceable 
against the interest of a junior lienholder not made a party to an action to foreclose the lien 
within the six month period."). "Thus, in a foreclosure action, the action (1) must be timely 
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brought under statute; and (2) must timely name the proper interested parties." Parkwest Homes 
II, 154 Idaho at 684. 
"This holding encourages judicial efficiency and finality of litigation by mandating the 
joinder of all interests and competing claims in a lien foreclosure action." Bonner Building 
Supply, Inc. v. Std. Forest Products, Inc., 106 Idaho 682,686 (Ct. App. 1984) (emphasis added). 
"The limitation prescribed by statute of the time within which an action must be brought in a 
proper court for the foreclosure of a mechanic's lien is not the ordinary statute of limitation, 
which is waived, if not pleaded." Western Loan & Bldg. Co. v. Gem State Lumber Co., 32 Idaho 
497, 185 P. 554,555 (1919). "The time within which the suit must be brought operates as a 
limitation of the liability itself as created, and not of the remedy alone." Id.; accord Terra-West, 
Inc. v. Idaho Mut. Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393,403 (2010). "It is a condition attached to the right 
to sue at all." Id. 
2. There is no Dispute the Appellant Failed to Timely Join the Trustees 
Under the Affected Deeds of Trusts. 
The pertinent facts supporting the trial court's entry of summary judgment on this front 
are simple and without dispute: 
• Appellant recorded its initial mechanic's lien on January 29, 2009. (R. at 119). 
• On February 11, 2009, Appellant alleges it received a payment in the amount of 
$25,000.00 towards partial satisfaction of the amount secured by the lien. (R. at 119). In 
accordance with LC.§ 45-510, it had six (6) months from the date of the payment to file 
suit and join all proper parties; August 11, 2009. 
• On July 26, 2011, Appellant recorded a second mechanic's lien. (R. at 120). Pursuant to 
LC. § 45-510, Appellant's six month deadline to file suit and join all necessary parties 
tolled on January 26, 2012. Id. 
• Appellant filed its amended pleading in which it seeks to judicially foreclose its 
mechanic's lien(s) on January 12, 2012. (R. at 120). 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 8 
• To date, it has not named or sought to join the respective trustees of the Monument 
Heights Deed of Trust or the St. Louis/Stephens Deed of Trust. (R. at 120); see also App. 
Brief, p. 5. 
Appellant cannot escape the unavoidable facts that it failed to join the trustees under the 
Monument Heights Deed of Trust and St. Louis/Stephens Deed of Trust within the applicable six 
month window imposed by LC.§ 45-510. Consistent with the well established authority 
regarding the failure to timely comply with LC. § 45-510, the trial court properly concluded that 
Appellant's mechanic's liens were rendered lost and unenforceable against the legal title held by 
the trustees under the Monument Heights and St. Louis/Stephens deeds of trust. 
3. Appellant's Argument is Contrary to the Fundamental Judicial Doctrine of 
Stare Decisis. 
Without any supporting facts, explanation or reasoned analysis, Appellant claims that 
Parkwest Homes II is not "in line with the practical reality of what the Idaho real estate bar, 
lending industry, construction industry and title industry use every day ... " and should be 
reversed or modified. This bare argument is unavailing as it fails to demonstrate why this Court 
should ignore the well-established doctrine of stare decisis. 
Importantly, the rule of stare decisis dictates that courts follow controlling precedent 
unless it is "manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless 
overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued 
injustice." Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77 (1990). The rule, or doctrine as 
it is commonly referred, is "founded largely upon expediency and sound principles of public 
policy." Walling v. Bown, 9 Idaho 740 (1904). In 1899, the Supreme Court remarked: 
No good would be accomplished by overruling that decision, but much evil and 
confusion would result therefrom. Whether that decision was right or not, public 
policy and sound legal principle demand that we now adhere to it, and regard that 
question as a sealed book, which is no longer open to public scrutiny. 
People v. Alturas County, 6 Idaho 418, 55 P. 1067, 1067 (1899). 
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Idaho's mechanic lien statute has a historical mooring in equity. Pacific States Savings, 
Loan &Bldg. Co. v. Duboise, 11 Idaho 319, 83 P. 513,514 (1905). In 1893, Idaho's legislature 
codified the equitable rule and in doing so, borrowed heavily upon the laws of the State of 
California. Id. Since that time, Idaho's mechanic lien statute, LC. § 45-501 et seq, has remained 
intact. For this reason, most of the leading judicial precedent interpreting the requirements is 
many decades old. 
An important illustration of the stare decisis doctrine is the continual reliance placed 
upon Pacific States Sav., Loan & Bldg. Co. v. Dubois, a decision that is now 106 years old, by 
Idaho's appellate and trial courts. 11 Idaho 319 (1905). In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court 
took an opportunity to construe Idaho's mechanic's lien statute, LC. § 45-506, and the basis for 
prioritizing various lien claimants. Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court was invited to depart 
from the historical construction placed upon LC. § 45-506 by the Pacific States Sav. decision. 
See Ultrawall, Inc. v. Wash. Mutual Bank, 135 Idaho 832, 834-35 (2001). Unsurprisingly, this 
Court held that Pacific States is just as applicable and controlling today as it was 106 years ago. 
Id. 
The case at bar is no different. In fact, for at least one century, Idaho's courts have held 
that the failure to timely comply with LC. § 45-501 renders a mechanic's lien lost and 
unenforceable against any omitted subordinate interests. Cont 'l & Commercial Trust & Sav. 
Bankv. Pac. Coast Pipe Co., 222 F. 781, 788 (9th Cir. 1915). While it might be argued that 
Parkwest Homes II represents a recent expansion of that century-old rule, the foundation for the 
holding and rationale is not. 
The Parkwest Homes II decision was released over one (1) full year ago. Given the 
intervening passage of time, one would expect other state appellate courts to have rejected the 
principle if it was so contrary to the "practical reality" as Appellant suggests. Based upon a 
review of the citations, however, there does not appear to be any evidence that has remotely 
occurred. 
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Furthermore, the record is completely void of any evidence suggesting the Parkwest 
Homes II is not in line with the practical reality, or how it has created confusion and uncertainty 
as alleged. Thus, all this Court is left with is conjecture from the Appellant. 
In sum, Appellant has not remotely demonstrated how the Parkwest Homes II decision is 
"manifestly wrong, ... proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or ... overruling it is necessary 
to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice." See Houghland 
Farms, 119 Idaho at 77. Absent a clear demonstration by Appellant, stare decisis demands the 
continued adherence to the unqualified holding as announced in this Court's recent Parkwest 
Homes II opinion. 
4. Appellant's Concerns Stem from the Fact that Idaho is a "Title Theory" 
State Which is a Matter for the Legislature to Address, Rather than this 
Court. 
Idaho's Trust Deeds Act, Idaho Code§ 45-1502 et seq, was codified by Idaho's 
Legislature in 1957. The Act provides that a "trust deed," which is more commonly known as a 
deed of trust, is a "deed ... conveying real property to a trustee in trust to secure the 
performance of an obligation of the grantor ... " I.C. § 45-1502(3). Similarly, our Legislature 
has defined the "trustee" as one "to whom the legal title to the real property is conveyed by trust 
deed ... " I.C. § 45-1502(4). The Act further states that a deed of trust "shall be a conveyance of 
real property." I.C. § 45-1513. As a result of this Legislative enactment, it is said that "Idaho 
transitioned from a 'lien theory' state to a 'title passes' state ... "Long v. Williams, I 05 Idaho 
585, 587 (1983). 
In recognition of the Long decision and its progeny discussing the effect of a deed of 
trust, the Parkwest Homes II decision established that it is necessary to name the trustee under a 
subordinate deed of trust in an action to foreclose a lien. Parkwest Homes II, 154 at 685. While 
the specific holding may have been new, the basis is merely a recognition of the interaction 
between two long standing statutes; I.C. § 45-510 which dates back to 1893; and LC.§ 45-1502 
et seq which appeared in 1957. 
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In lien theory states, the deed of trust does not convey legal title to the encumbered real 
property. Rather, the grantor of the deed of trust creates a lien on the real property to secure 
performance of the obligation. This distinction is not without distinction and cannot be ignored 
as Appellant suggests. 
"When the language of a statute is definite, courts must give effect to that meaning 
whether or not the legislature anticipated the statute's result." In re Application for Permit No. 
36-7200, 121 Idaho 819,824 (1992). "The wisdom,justice, policy or expediency of a statute are 
questions for the legislature alone." Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 177 (1962). "It is the duty 
of the courts to interpret the meaning of legislature enactments without regard to the possible 
results." Id. "If it is socially or economically unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not 
judicial." Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 895 (2011). 
In its Brief, Appellant invites this Court to disregard the express language of Idaho's 
Trust Deed Act and hold that the legal title held by a trustee under a deed of trust is somehow de 
minimus and can be ignored in a lien foreclosure action. This essentially amounts to 
transforming Idaho into a lien theory state, despite the clear and unambiguous language of LC. § 
45-1502 et seq. Out of respect of the separation of powers, this argument is best reserved for the 
Idaho Legislature to correct via legislation. For this important reason, Respondents submit that 
Appellant's argument is unavailing as it is at direct odds with the separation of powers. 
B. The District Court Correctly Held that Deed of Trust Trustees are Necessary 
Parties and Must be Timely Joined in Accordance with I.C. § 45-510. 
As an additional issue on appeal, Appellant argues in unconvincing fashion that the 
district court erred in holding that the trustees under Respondents' deeds of trust were necessary 
parties because they "hold such minimal title." This strained argument merits little response as it 
has nothing to do with the district court's analysis. Rather, it is simply another disguised 
challenge to this Court's Parkwest Homes, II decision. 
In Parkwest Homes II, this Court held without qualification: 
In light of this authority, because a mechanic's lien is lost as to any interest in 
property not named in a foreclosure action, we hold that a subsequent holder of 
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legal title to property encumbered by a deed of trust and a mechanic's lien, takes 
the property free and clear of the mechanic's lien, where the lienor fails to name 
the trustee of the deed of trust in an action to enforce the mechanic's lien within 
the period of time required by statute. In other words, when seeking to foreclose a 
lien on property encumbered by a deed of trust, it is necessary to name the trustee 
who holds legal title to the property. 
154 Idaho at 685 ( emphasis added). It was this very language that the district court premised its 
decision on. (R. at 125). 
In its Brief, Appellant concedes that it has not joined either of the trustees under the 
Respondents' respective deeds of trust. App. Brief, 5. ("ACI ... has never named the Trustee on 
the deeds of trust ... "). Further, Appellant's Brief does not contain any reasoned analysis that 
the district court misapplied the undisputed facts to the holding announced in Parkwest Homes, 
JI. Rather, it continues to assert that because the legal title held by a trustee under a deed of trust 
is so minimal, it is cannot constitute a necessary party. Again, this argument ignores the clear 
and unqualified holding of this Court's Parkwest Homes, II decision. As the Appellant, it bore 
the burden to demonstrate error by specific references to the record, transcripts and reasoned 
argument. Student Loan Fund of Idaho, Inc. v. Duerner, 131 Idaho 45, 54 (1997). There is 
absolutely no evidence that the district court erred in its analysis. Therefore, Respondents submit 
this issue summarily fails. 
C. Parkwest Homes II Was Anything But Limited to the Facts of the Appeal and 
Therefore Cannot be Distinguished from the Matter at Hand. 
The holding in Parkwest Homes II was anything but constrained to the specific facts of 
the appeal. Rather, this Court began by framing the issue presented and its respective holding, as 
follows: 
We turn our attention to whether a lienor seeking to enforce a mechanic's lien 
against the property encumbered by a deed of trust must name the trustee of the 
deed of trust within the period of time required by statute to give effect to the 
mechanic's lien against subsequent holders of legal title. 
We hold that the lienor must. 
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154 Idaho at 683 ( emphasis added). There is absolutely no language in the issue as framed by 
this Court which indicates it was limited to the specific facts presented in that appeal. Quite to 
the contrary, the issue is outlined broadly and speaks in general terms. 
was: 
After noting the basis for the holding, this Court stated the practical effect in that case 
In light of this authority, because a mechanic's lien is lost as to any interest in 
property not named in a foreclosure action, we hold that a subsequent holder of 
legal title to property encumbered by a deed of trust and a mechanic's lien, takes 
the property free and clear of the mechanic's lien, where the lienor fails to name 
the trustee of the deed of trust in an action to enforce the mechanic's lien within 
the period of time required by statute. 
Id., at 685. The Court immediately followed up by distilling and repeating the fundamental 
holding as follows: 
In other words, when seeking to foreclose a lien on property encumbered by a 
deed of trust, it is necessary to name the trustee who holds legal title to the 
property. 
154 Idaho at 685 ( emphasis added). As noted above, this holding is anything but qualified or 
married to the facts presented in the Parkwest Homes II matter. Therefore, Appellant's 
suggestion that Parkwest Homes II must be distinguished from the facts in this appeal summarily 
fails as well. 
D. Idaho's Mechanic's Lien Statutes Cannot be Liberally Construed to Create a 
Lien Where One Does not Exist. 
Respondents' acknowledge the longstanding body oflaw seemingly cited by all lien 
claimants which states that "the provisions of LC. § 45-501 are to be liberally construed in the 
favor of the persons who perform labor upon or furnish materials to be used in the construction, 
alteration, or repair of a building or structure." L & W Supply Corp., 136 Idaho at 742-43; citing 
Great Plains Equip., Inc., 132 Idaho at 760. Appellant, however, fails to recognize the more 
pertinent line of authority which holds "th[at] rule, however, 'does not permit the court to create 
a lien where none exists or was intended by the legislature."' Id., at 743. 
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Once again, it must be noted for the Appellant that "the time within which the suit must 
be brought operates as a limitation of the liability itself as created, and not of the remedy alone." 
Western Loan & Bldg. Co., 185 P. at 555. Thus, its request that the time limitations imposed by 
I.C. § 45-510 be excused due to its good faith compliance with the substantive lien requirements 
imposed by I.C. § 45-507 would have the effect of "creating a lien [ie. liability] where none 
exists." For this fundamental reason, Appellant's argument fails. 
E. Appellant is Barred from Contesting the Substance of the Judgment Due to 
its Failure to Raise the Issue Below. 
Appellant exercises a challenge to the substance of the district court's memorandum 
decision as yet another means to challenge the Parkwest Homes, II decision and rationale set 
forth in Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585 (1983) and Defendant Av. Idaho State Bar, 132 Idaho 
662 (1999). This disguised challenge is another waste of argument. 
Much of Appellant's argument focuses on the effect of the district court's memorandum 
decision. What Appellant ignores, however, is that the Partial Summary Judgment Against A CI 
Northwest, Inc. is the operative document, not the memorandum decision. (R. at 191-93). 
Despite this, Appellant makes no effort to demonstrate that the judgment is in error. While 
Appellant takes aim at the actions of the district court, there is no reasoned analysis as to how 
memorandum decision or judgment are contrary to law or not supported by the facts. As the 
Appellant, it bears the burden of demonstrating error on appeal. Therefore, Appellant should be 
deemed to have waived this issue on appeal. 
Next, it is a longstanding rule of the Supreme Court that" it will not consider issues 
raised for the first time on appeal." Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 746 
(2007). To begin, there is indication in the record or transcripts that the Appellant sought 
clarification of the district court's memorandum decision. More importantly, there is no 
evidence that Appellant challenged the form and substance of the judgment before or after it was 
issued. See I.R.C.P. 59(e). For these reasons, Appellant should not be allowed to present this 
additional issue on appeal. 
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F. Appellant's Concerns Regarding Application of the Parkwest Homes 
Holding Are Best Reserved for the Idaho Legislature. 
In its judgment, the district court aptly held that Appellant's mechanic's liens were lost 
and unenforceable against the legal title held by the trustees under each of Respondents' 
respective deeds of trust. (R. at 192). The effect of this judgment is that any subsequent transfer 
by the trustee (i.e. a deed of reconveyance or trustee's deed), will be free and clear of Appellant's 
liens. 
The Parkwest Homes II decision merely recognized that a trustee under a subordinate 
deed of trust is a necessary party when seeking to foreclose a mechanic's lien. As such, the 
trustee must be joined within the six ( 6) limitation imposed by LC. § 45-510. 
The effect of the failure to join a necessary party stems not from Parkwest Homes, II, but 
rather, Western Loan & Bldg. Co. and its progeny. 185 P. 554,555 (1919). In Western Loan & 
Bldg. Co., this Court adopted the construction placed upon LC. § 45-510 and its predecessor by 
the federal courts of this state. Id. Since that time, Idaho's appellate courts have continuously 
held that "a lien foreclosure action must be commenced within six months against the persons 
versus whose interests the lien is being asserted; otherwise the lien [i]s lost as to those persons." 
Bonner Bldg. Supply Inc., 106 Idaho at 685. 
Appellant now argues that the significance of this effect somehow demands that this 
Court revisit the Parkwest Homes II decision. Again, "it is the duty of the courts to interpret the 
meaning of legislature enactments without regard to the possible results." Berry v. Koehler, 84 
Idaho 170, 177 (1962). In recognition of this important principle, Appellant's arguments should 
be left for our Legislature to address. 
G. Appellant's Request for Fees is Contrary to Established Law and not 
Supported by Any Argument. 
In its Brief, Appellant designated the following issue on appeal: 
Should ACI be awarded its attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to LC. § 12-120(3) 
providing for attorney's fees in commercial transactions and LC. § 45-513 
providing for attorney's fees in an action on a mechanic's or materialman's lien? 
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App. Brief, 6. At no point in its Brief does Appellant expend an ounce of energy developing this 
issue. In its Conclusion, however, Appellant again pays tribute to this putative issue and asserts: 
For the foregoing reasons, ACI respectfully requests that the Court ... award ACI 
its attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and 
45-513. 
At best, Appellant's undeveloped request for fees is borderline frivolous and therefore must fail. 
It is a fundamental appellate rule that the Appellant bears the burden of developing all 
issues presented on appeal. Along these lines, Idaho Appellate Rules remind Appellants as 
follows: 
Appellant's Brief. The brief of the appellant shall contain the following 
divisions under appropriate headings: 
Argument. The argument shall contain the contentions of the appellant with 
respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon. 
I.A.R. 35(a)(6). This Court has held on numerous occasions '"if issues on appeal are not 
supported by propositions oflaw, authority or argument, they will not be considered ... A party 
waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking."' 
Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 18 (2012). Given that Appellant expended 
absolutely no energy developing this issue on appeal, it should be deemed to have conclusively 
waived any claim to attorney's fees or costs on appeal. 
Disregarding the deficient manner in which the issue is addressed on appeal, it ignores 
the controlling Idaho authority holding that attorney's fees are not available on appeal to either 
party in mechanic's liens matters. This appeal is strictly limited to the enforceability of 
Appellant's mechanic's liens. For that reason, Appellant request for attorneys' fees on appeal 
pursuant to LC.§ 12-120(3) or 45-513 is contrary to the well-established and overwhelming case 
law on this front. 
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First, Appellant's lien foreclosure cause of action is governed by I.C. § 45-501, et seq. 
The comprehensive Act contains a specific provision providing for an award of attorney's fees to 
the prevailing claimant. See I. C. § 45-513. Idaho's appellate courts have consistently held that 
Idaho Code§ 45-513 does not permit an award of fees on appeal. See First Federal Sav. Bank of 
Twin Falls v. Riedesel Engineering, Inc., 154 Idaho 626,638 (2012) ("However, section 45-513 
does not provide for the award of attorney fees on appeal, because the legislature deleted that 
provision from the statute prior to adopting it."); accord Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v. Sumpter, 
139 Idaho 846 (2004). 
Second, Idaho's appellate courts have repeatedly held "where two statutes appear to 
apply to the same case or subject matter, the specific statute will control over the more general 
statute." Athay v. Stacey, 146 Idaho 407,419 (2008). Thus, this Court has held "because section 
45-513 is a specific statute providing for an award of attorney fees in proceedings to foreclose a 
mechanic's lien, Idaho Code section 12-120(3) and 12-121, which are general statutes, do not 
apply." Parkwest Homes, LLC, 154 Idaho at 686; accord First Federal Sav. Bank a/Twin Falls, 
154 Idaho at 638. 
For these reasons, there is no disputing that the statutes casually cited by Appellant, LC. 
§§ 12-120(3) and 45-513, do not provide an avenue ofrelief as to those fees Appellant incurred 
on appeal. 
H. Respondents are Entitled to an Award of their Costs and Reasonable 
Attorney's Fees Incurred Defending this Appeal. 
Respondents should be awarded their costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred 
defending this Appeal pursuant to Rules 11.2, 40 and 41, I.A.R .. 
Rule 11.2, Idaho Appellate Rules, provides: 
(a) ... The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the 
attorney or party has read the notice of appeal, petition, motion, brief or other 
document; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief after 
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a 
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, 
and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost oflitigation. If the notice 
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of appeal, petition, motion, brief, or other document is signed in violation of this 
rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the 
person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which 
may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the 
reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the notice of appeal, 
petition, motion, brief or other document including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
"A signed legal document violates Rule 11.2 if (1) it is not well grounded in fact; (2) it is not 
warranted by existing law or a good-faith extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; 
and (3) it was interposed for an improper purpose." Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 497, 504 
(2010). 
The Supreme Court has found "that where a party failed to supply an adequate record its 
appeal was not well grounded in fact and thus violated the first element of I.A.R. 11.1. 4" Read v. 
Harvey, 147 Idaho 364, 371 (2009); citing Fritts, 144 Idaho at 176. Similarly, it has held where 
the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating error by the trial court, "its request for this Court 
to act in the absence of evidence to support their claims was unwarranted under the second 
element of I.A.R. 11. l." Finally, "this Court has held that 'although an attorney's purpose in 
filing an appeal may not always appear clear from the record, this Court can infer intent and 
purpose from the attorney's actions and the surrounding circumstances." Lattin, 149 Idaho at 
504; citing Fritts, 144 Idaho at 176. 
Throughout this Brief, Respondents have illustrated the deficient manner in which 
Appellant has presented its issues. This lack of reasoned analysis and specific references to the 
record was no more apparent than in Appellant's claim for attorney's fees. Not only did 
Appellant fail to provide any argument in support, the fundamental claim was a direct odds with 
the overwhelming case law of Idaho's appellate courts. Due to the complete lack of reasoned 
argument, there is not basis to conclude that Appellant's request was supported by a "good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." 
4 I.AR. 11.1 was subsequently redenominated as I.AR. 11.2. See Lattin, 149 Idaho at 504. 
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For these reasons, along with each of the deficiencies in Appellant's presentation noted 
throughout this Brief, Respondents submit they are entitled to an award of sanctions in the form 
of their reasonable attorney's fees and costs. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons outlined above, Respondents respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
the judgment of the trial court. Further, Respondents requests that they be awarded their costs 
and reasonable attorney's fees incurred defending this Appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of May, 2014. 
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